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1. Introduction  
 
A combination of slow productivity growth and rising income inequality in most advanced, and 
several emerging-market, economies has rekindled interest in the empirical links between economic 
growth and income distribution. In particular, although the specific channels through which growth and 
income distribution are related are complex and often difficult to disentangle empirically, there is 
increasing, albeit weak, cross-country evidence that income inequality undermines growth1 and policy 
initiatives which are growth-friendly often do affect social groups differently.2  
 
Of particular interest in this strand of literature is the experience of countries that have managed to 
sustain spells of uninterrupted output growth without a concomitant deterioration in the interpersonal 
distribution of income. In fact, these episodes, which we characterize as inclusive growth, are not 
infrequent. Nor are they circumscribed to specific regions or time periods. For example, on the basis of 
the data available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), there are 268 episodes 
of increases in GDP per capita without an associated deterioration in the distribution of household 
disposable income in the sample of countries for which information is available for the period 1980-
2013.3   
 
Based on this chronology, we estimated pooled logit and multinomial probit models to gauge 
empirically the determinants of inclusive growth episodes. We started by looking at a variety of output 
growth and income distribution covariates, including indicators of the population’s educational 
attainment, the size and redistributive potential of tax-benefit systems, as well as indicators of demand 
and economic structure, including trade openness, inflation and unemployment. We also looked at 
various measures of financial deepening, infrastructure and institutional characteristics that are known 
to influence growth and income distribution. We tested for the robustness of our empirical findings by 
looking at alternative estimators and different sets of growth and income distribution covariates.  
 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Washington Centre for Equitable Growth (2015) and OECD (2015a) for reviews of the 
empirical literature. 
2  See, for example, Causa et al. (2014) and OECD (2015b). 
3  These episodes include, for instance, France between 1985 and 1989, Germany between 1995 and 1997, Brazil 




We depart from the literature by focusing on a chronology of episodes linking growth to income 
distribution, rather than estimating (jointly or independently) growth and income distribution equations 
and testing for specific channels of causality. In this regard, our approach is akin to that of Anand et al. 
(2013), who also identify episodes of inclusive growth on the basis of changes in GDP per capita and 
the distribution of income for a selected group of countries. We nevertheless use different estimation 
techniques and look at additional macroeconomic and institutional variables that can shed light on the 
likelihood of an inclusive growth episode. 
 
Our main findings are that the probability of an inclusive growth episode rises with increases in 
human capital accumulation, redistribution through the tax-benefit system, labor force participation and 
multifactor productivity, as well as trade openness, and it falls with a rise in inflation, output volatility 
and unemployment. Also, we show that institutions matter, and inclusive growth episodes are more likely 
in countries with durable political systems, regular parliamentary elections and electoral regimes based 
on proportional representation. Moreover, although the empirical findings are somewhat weaker, 
financial deepening, as reflected in an increase in different measures of the stock of credit in the 
economy, reduces the probability of an inclusive growth episode, probably because of its association 
with a higher probability of occurrence of banking and financial crises, which are in turn detrimental to 
growth and improvements in the distribution of income.          
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
outlines the empirical methodology and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the main results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Insights from the Literature 
 
Economic theory predicts a trade-off between equity and efficiency: for countries that are already 
on, or close to, the technological frontier, the distribution of income can only be improved by sacrificing 
growth (Acemoglu et al, 2012; Andersen and Maibom, 2016). To test this prediction, the empirical 
literature has looked at the determinants of growth and income distribution separately, often by including 
synthetic metrics of income distribution, such as the Gini coefficient and quintile income shares, in 




nevertheless mixed, with a few studies suggesting a negative relationship between income distribution 
and growth (e.g., Clarke, 1995; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Berg and Ostry, 2011; Ostry et al. (2014); 
Brueckner and Lederman, 2015).4  
 
As for causality running from growth to income distribution, the empirical literature also reports 
mixed results. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) find a negative 
relationship, whereas Li and Zhou (1998) and Forbes (2000) find a positive relationship, with Deininger 
and Squire (1996), Ravallion and Chen (1997), Easterly (1999), Barro (2000), Dollar and Kraay (2002), 
and Lopez (2004), among others, reporting no correlation at all between these variables. In any case, the 
linkages between growth and income distribution depend on initial conditions, such as the level of 
income, the incidence of poverty and the extent of asset inequality in a country. They are also affected 
by a host of slow-moving, structural parameters, such as geography, demography, governance and 
politics (World Bank, 2005). 
 
The literature has also looked at the relationship between growth and inequality simultaneously. 
Rather than including income distribution indicators directly in augmented Solow-type equations, as in 
the traditional growth literature, Hermansen et al. (2016) and Causa et al. (2016) focus on the joint 
estimation of the distributional effects of a variety of stylized structural (supply-side) reforms in OECD 
countries. They find that the benefits of growth do trickle down, albeit differently, to different social 
groups. The papers combine macro-level estimates of the impact of structural reforms on growth with 
micro-level estimates of the impact of structural reforms on household incomes across the income 
distribution. The authors find that structural reforms, in particular those related to social protection, affect 
inequality especially among the lowest income deciles. More recent strands of the empirical literature 
have benefited from the availability of more granular inequality data including at the sub-national level.5  
 
                                                 
4  Investment and the distribution of assets, including land, are important channels through which inequality affects 
growth. These findings are consistent with the theoretical model developed by Galor and Zeira (1993), which relates 
income inequality to economic growth via credit market imperfections and indivisibilities in investment. 
5  For example, Bartolini and de Mello (2016) look at the effects of intergovernmental fiscal relations on growth and 




Where positive effects have been found, the literature has focused on identifying the specific 
policy levers that can be considered ‘super pro-poor’ in that they can generate inclusive growth by 
delivering stronger growth together with improvements in the distribution of income. Indeed, Lopez 
(2004) surveys the literature and finds that macroeconomic stability, measured by inflation, as well as 
policies that aim to enhance educational attainment and infrastructure tend to deliver ‘win-win’ outcomes 
by enhancing growth and equalizing the income distribution. These findings are consistent with most of 
the empirical evidence reported below.  
 
The strand of literature that is closest to our analysis focuses instead on specific definitions of 
inclusive growth based on the concept of generalized concentration curves following Ali and Son (2007). 
The idea is that social welfare increases with growth but falls with income transfers from poor to rich 
individuals. As a result, a combination of changes in GDP per capita, to capture the growth dimension, 
and in the distribution of income can be used to define episodes of inclusive growth using cross-country 
aggregate data. In this context, growth is defined as inclusive if it increases social welfare, which depends 
on the opportunities available to the population, and how those opportunities are shared among the 
population. Evidence is provided for education and health care in the Philippines using data for 1998 
and 2004.  
 
Other studies have indeed been based on this idea. For example, Anand et al. (2013) provide 
evidence based on panel data for a broad sample of countries during 1970-2010 and highlight the 
importance of education, investment and trade openness as determinants of inclusive growth. While we 
also find evidence of the importance of these drivers, we use different estimation techniques and look at 
additional macroeconomic and institutional variables that can shed light on the likelihood of occurrence 
of inclusive growth episodes. Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) and Dollar et al. (2015) also rely on the 
social welfare approach to relate changes in inequality and growth using large sets of cross-country 






3. Empirical Approach 
3.1. The testable hypotheses 
 
 This section identifies possible channels through which policy and non-policy variables influence 
changes in growth and the distribution of income. A few key mechanisms can be highlighted. 
 
Economic growth: when is it inclusive?  
  
The hypothesis that economic growth is associated with a better distribution of income needs to 
be tested empirically. As noted above, while economic growth brings with it greater material prosperity, 
it is not always true that the benefits of growth are shared equitably in society, resulting in an 
improvement in the distribution of income. The experience of Latin America indeed shows that 
economic growth, which many countries in the region managed to sustain during the 1990s and 2000s, 
is a weak predictor of the dramatic improvement in the distribution of income that the region has 
experienced since the turn of the millennium. Several Latin American countries, including Brazil, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Peru are among the inclusive growth episodes identified in our 
chronology, but the empirical literature shows that the causal links between growth in real GDP per 
capita and improvements in the distribution of income are tenuous in the region (Brezzi and de Mello, 
2016).  
 
Social protection: the role of tax-benefit systems 
 
Tax-benefit systems are the main policy instruments to redistribute income ex post in advanced 
economies, and their effects on growth depend on disincentives to labor supply and other distortions that 
have a detrimental impact on efficiency, as discussed above. In developing countries and emerging-
market economies, tax-benefit systems are less developed and therefore potentially less redistributive, 
essentially on account of lower revenue-to-GDP ratios, greater reliance on indirect taxes, lower 
progressivity in direct tax schedules and less comprehensive formal social safety nets. In the case of 
Latin America, for example, incidence analysis shows that the redistributive impact of tax-benefit 




Uruguay (Brezzi and de Mello, 2016), although they are considerably less redistributive than in advanced 
economies.  
 
Education and skills: the role of productivity and skill premia 
  
The accumulation of human capital and skills is an essential driver of both productivity, and 
ultimately GDP growth, and income distribution. Indicators of educational attainment and quality of 
education are standard regressors in any Solow-type growth regression. At the same time, an increase in 
the supply of better educated workers tends to be associated with lower skill premia, measured as the 
increase in wages associated with an additional year of schooling or qualification, which is in turn likely 
to be associated with lower wage dispersion. Again, the experience of Latin America is illustrative: 
educational attainment improved rapidly in several countries throughout the 1990s, leading to a reduction 
in returns to schooling and, as a result, labor income inequality, although skill premia remain high in the 
region.6 At the same time, increased dynamism in sectors, such as services, which require relatively low 
skilled workers, has created demand for workers with lower skills. 
 
Structural reforms: shifting resources and rewards 
  
Economic growth ultimately depends on the ability of an economy to push the productivity 
frontier through innovation and technological prowess or move towards the frontier by shifting resources 
from lower to higher-productivity sectors or activities. Policy action to support innovation, promote 
competition in product markets, deepen financial markets, for example, are all growth-enhancing but not 
necessarily equalizing, given the balance of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from pro-growth reforms. While there 
is a considerably large body of empirical analysis on the growth effects of a variety of structural reforms, 
especially for developed countries, evidence is still limited on their distributional impacts. As far as the 
advanced economies are concerned, it seems that some pro-growth policies that raise GDP through 
increased productivity, such as support for innovation, may lead to technology-driven widening of the 
wage distribution among employed workers (OECD, 2015b). Other policies that promote labor force 
                                                 
6  According to OECD calculations, workers with tertiary education or equivalent advanced research qualifications 
earn about 250 percent more than those with secondary education in Brazil (over 300 percent in Chile), against the OECD 




participation and job creation also widen the wage dispersion, but this effect may be offset at least in 
part through job creation, not least among lower-skilled workers. By contrast, reforms to improve access 
to education, active labor market policies and growth-friendly tax and transfer systems tend to be 
equalizing in the sense that they tend to reduce wage dispersion and/or household income inequality. 
 
Trade and current account liberalization are important drivers of growth by facilitating access by 
domestic producers to imported inputs embodying more modern technologies, creating competition in 
domestic product markets and also possibly removing impediments to foreign investment. The 
distributional effects of liberalization are nevertheless difficult to gauge and depend on the relative 
demand for skills and the composition of job creation and destruction in different markets. For example, 
the reduction of import tariffs that took place in many Latin American countries during the 1990s as part 
of broader economic liberalization programmes affected sectors that were relatively intensive in 
unskilled labor. The attendant increase in demand for skills could not be met by a concomitant expansion 
of supply, resulting in a deterioration in the distribution of income (Gasparini and Lustig, 2011). Skill-
saving technological progress often follows trade liberalization is likely to have compounded this 
unequalising effect. While this is indeed the case in most Latin American countries, Brazil seems to have 
been an exception in that trade liberalization led to a change in relative prices in the first half of the 
1990s that benefited unskilled workers, leading to a fall in the skill premium (Ferreira et al., 2007). 
 
Other factors: demand management and the external environment  
  
Other factors, such as broad macroeconomic management and changes in the external 
environment, also contribute to growth and changes in the distribution of income. High inflation and 
output volatility have a detrimental effect on potential growth and also penalize the worse-off and 
vulnerable social groups who are less well equipped than the better-off to insure themselves against the 
associated job and real income losses.  
 
Terms-of-trade gains are also associated with stronger growth, at least in the short term, but their 
effect on the distribution of income depends on the relative demand for skills in the tradable and non-
tradable sectors. Again, the experience of Latin America is illustrative, given that the inclusive growth 




sizeable gains in their terms of trade as a result of the concomitant long commodity price cycle. However, 
empirical evidence suggests that these gains in the terms of trade have supported growth, but they have 
not played a dominant role in explaining the reduction in income inequality in the region (Gasparini et 
al., 2011; de la Torre et al., 2012).  
 
3.2. The estimating equations 
 
We define an inclusive growth episode (IG) for country i at time t as the combination of growth 
in GDP per capita without a concomitant deterioration in the distribution of household disposable income 
between t-1 and t. Based on this bivariate characterization, we estimate logistic regressions to assess the 
likelihood of an inclusive growth episode and test the channels identified above (economic growth, social 
protection, education and skills, and structural reforms), while controlling for other determinants of 
growth and income distribution.7 In particular, we estimate the following model:8 
 
 Prob(IG 1|X) ( ' ),i X    α       (1) 
where α is a vector of the parameters to be estimated, X is a vector of exogenous variables, and 
)(  is the logistic function.9  






IG 1  if  IG 0,  and 0 otherwise.
i it it   
 
α
     (2) 
with i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T; i captures the unobserved individual effects; and it is an error 
term.  
We also estimate an multinomial probit model (MNP) to take account of alternative combinations 
of growth in GDP per capita and changes in inequality.10 The MNP model is used with discrete dependent 
variables that take on more than two outcomes that do not have a natural ordering. In our context, there 
are three other possible combinations of growth in GDP per capita and changes in income distribution 
                                                 
7  This is akin to the methodology proposed by Aoyagi and Ganelli (2015), who consider the direct impact of a fixed 
block of structural determinants, coupled with a set of controls. 
8  For details on this binary choice model see, for example, Greene (2012, Ch. 17). 
9  We should note that, as probit models do not render themselves well to the fixed-effects treatment due to the 
incidental parameter problem (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 15, p. 484), we estimate a logit model with fixed-effects. 




that can be considered: i) non-positive growth in GDP per capita with deterioration in income 
distribution; ii) non-positive growth in GDP per capita with no deterioration in income distribution; and 
iii) positive growth with deterioration in income distribution.  
In the MNP model, the choice probabilities among a set of categorically distributed alternatives 
(in our case, four) are simultaneously estimated.11 The stochastic error terms for the implementation of 
this model are assumed to have independent, standard normal distributions. Evaluating the likelihood 
function involves computing probabilities from the multivariate normal distribution.12 
These combinations can therefore be used to define an alternative dependent variable: 0 (non-
positive growth, deterioration in income distribution), 1 (non-positive growth, no deterioration in 
income distribution), 2 (positive growth, deterioration in income distribution), and 3 (positive growth, 
no deterioration in income distribution). Option 3 corresponds to the inclusive growth case discussed 
above. In particular, the dependent variable “IG=1” in Model (1) can be replaced by “IG=0,1,2,3” in the 
multinomial probit estimations in our panel dataset. 
 
3.3. The data 
 
We use annual data on real GDP per capita available from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IMF’s IFS) database and on the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). We consider the Gini coefficient for income 
both gross and net of taxes and government transfers, and from alternative sources, including UN 
WIDER, the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) and the World Bank.  
 
Our data set includes 46 to 78 countries between 1980-2013, depending on the income 
distribution measure used. The number of inclusive growth episodes in our chronology is 268 with an 
average duration of 2.5 years. Most episodes last one year (Figure 1), although longer episodes, lasting 
5 years and more, are not infrequent. The average growth rate of real GDP per capita is about 3.3 percent 
                                                 
11 MNP was the chosen method since the alternative, a multinomial logit model (MNL) assumes the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). A violation of the IIA assumption results in inconsistent estimates. To test for a potential 
violation of the IIA assumption, we performed a Hausman-McFadden test and a Small-Hsiao test. Because the results of both 
the Hausman-McFadden and Small-Hsiao tests did not point at a confirmation of the IIA assumption, we could not safely use 
the MNL estimation and decided in favor of the MNP. 
12 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005, chap. 15) for a discussion of multinomial models, including multinomial probit. Long and 




in an episode, and the average reduction in the Gini coefficient is about 0.8. While duration does not 
seem to have much influence on the magnitude of changes in real GDP per capita, the reduction in the 
Gini coefficient tends to be more pronounced in episodes that last 4 years or less (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1. Frequency of inclusive growth episodes, 1980 - 2013 
Number of episodes by duration (in years) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2. Magnitude of inclusive growth episodes, 1980 - 2013 
Average change in real GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient by duration (in years) 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The set of regressors used in the estimations are as follows. To test for the growth channel, we 
include in the baseline specification the rate of growth of real GDP per capita (from IMF’s IFS), the rate 
of growth of labor productivity (computed as output per worker) and the rate of change in labor force 











































































including in the baseline regression the difference between the Gini coefficients on gross and net income 
to measure the redistributive potential of tax-benefit systems (as in Ostry et al., 2014). The 
education/skills channel is tested by including in the baseline regression an index of human capital, based 
on the number of years of schooling (data from Barro and Lee, 2013). Finally, to test for the demand 
management and external environment channel, we include a number of indicators from IMF’s IFS, such 
as the degree of trade openness (defined as exports plus imports over GDP), the 5-year rolling standard 
deviation of real GDP growth to proxy for output volatility (authors’ computation), the rate of CPI 
inflation (annual change in the log of CPI) and the unemployment rate (in percent).  
We control for level of development, which proxies for a country’s distance to the technological 
frontier, by using the lag of real GDP per capita. We also experiment with alternative controls (retrieved 
from the IMF’s IFS and World Bank’s WDI databases), such as the share of exports in GDP, changes in 
the terms-of-trade, the shares of employment in agriculture and industry (in percent), the value added of 
agriculture in percent of GDP and the duration (in years) of identified inclusive growth episodes to 
control for possible hysteresis effects. 
 
We look at how the occurrence of inclusive growth episodes depends on infrastructure 
development by testing for several different indicators, including paved roads per capita, kilometers of 
roads, kilometers of paved road, number of hospital beds per capita, number of sanitation facilities per 
capita, rural water source per capita, kilowatts of electricity production, and number of mobile and land 
line subscriptions per capita. These data are available from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
 
To shed more light on the effects of economic volatility, we experiment with indicators of 
financial crises, defined as dummy variables taking the value of one when a crisis occurs, and zero 
otherwise. They include domestic and foreign debt crises, currency crises and banking crises. The 
classification and identification of crisis episodes is available from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). We also 
rely on Leaven and Valencia (2010) to distinguish between systemic and non-systemic financial crises.  
 
As a robustness check, we also experiment with several indicators of government expenditure, 
including total spending and outlays on agriculture, education, health care, defense, transport and 




Economics Development (SPEED) put together by Yu et al. (2015), and all items are defined in real per 
capita terms. 
 
Data on political and institutional variables are available from the Polity IV project and Database 
of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001). These include: the number of years in office of the 
chief executive, checks and balances, whether a legislative election took place, whether the electoral 
system is based on proportional representation or majority, the margin of majority (defined as the number 
of government seats divided by total seats in the legislature), the Polity2 summary indicator of 
institutional quality (whose core is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy 
score, resulting in an unified polity scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly 
autocratic)), the durability of the political regime in years, the constraints on the executive and the Polity 
fragmentation or decentralization.13 
 
Financial development is measured by a set of variables retrieved from the Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD) put together by Čihák et al. (2012). The database covers 203 economies 
and includes measures of size of financial institutions and markets (financial depth), the degree to which 
individuals can and do use financial services (access), the efficiency of financial intermediaries and 
markets in intermediating resources and facilitating financial transactions (efficiency), and the stability 
of financial institutions and markets (stability). We rely on the following variables: bank private credit, 
deposit money bank assets, liquid liabilities, central bank assets, private credit by deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions, stock market capitalization, bank deposits and global leasing volume (all 
in percent of GDP), as well as net interest margins and the spread between lending and deposit rates 







                                                 
13  Note that some of the political variables considered may have non-linear effects. For instance, too many or too few 
years in which the chief executive is in power may affect inclusive growth differently. We tested this empirically and the 




4. Empirical results 
4.1. Logit models  
  
The results of the logit estimation of model (1) are reported in Table 1. While output growth 
seems to be a poor predictor of inclusive growth episodes, this is not the case of changes in multifactor 
productivity and labor force participation. The social protection and education/skills channels are also 
important and fairly robust across specifications: more redistributive tax-benefit systems and better 
educational outcomes14 are both associated with a higher probability of occurrence of an inclusive growth 
episode. Demand management and the external environment also matter: the more an economy is open 
to trade15 the higher is the probability of occurrence of an inclusive growth episode, but the higher the 
rates of inflation and unemployment, and the volatility of output, the lower is the probability of 
occurrence of an inclusive growth episode (although not always at conventional levels of statistical 
significance in the case of inflation). Moreover, less developed countries have a lower probability of 
occurrence of an inclusive growth episode, despite the hypothesis that distance from the technological 
frontier is expected to increase the likelihood of an inclusive growth episode.  
 
To shed more light on the role of structural factors, it can be argued that inclusive growth episodes 
are due to a combination of policies that complement and reinforce each other, creating a virtuous circle 
that in turn makes inclusive growth episodes more durable. To test this hypothesis, we included among 
the regressors an indicator of the duration of inclusive growth episodes (in number of successive years 
a country has sustained non-negative growth in GDP per capita and improvements in the distribution of 
income). The empirical findings indeed show that duration matters: the longer a country can sustain 
inclusive growth the higher the probability of occurrence of an episode. In the same vein, we 
experimented with restricting the sample to exclude short-lived inclusive growth episodes, or those 
defined as lasting only one year. The estimations, reported in Table A1 in the appendix, show that while 
coefficients lose some statistical significance, signs and qualitative findings hold. 16 
  
                                                 
14  Results (available upon request) are also robust to alternative proxies, such as the inclusion of either primary 
school enrolment per capita or secondary school enrolment per capita. 
15  Using instead terms of trade or the share of exports in GDP yields qualitatively similar results (not shown). 




Moreover, we extended the baseline specification to include the real effective exchange rate, as 
well as the shares of employment in agriculture and industry. We find that, whereas an appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate does not statistically affect the probability of occurrence of an inclusive 
growth episode, increases in the share of population working in industry (but not in agriculture) rise the 
likelihood of an inclusive growth episode taking place.17 
 
Table 1: Determinants of inclusive growth: Bivariate specification, baseline model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real GDP pc growth (lag) 1.865 -3.201 1.684 2.142 1.973 
 (2.805) (2.956) (3.435) (2.855) (2.854) 
Human capital 1.789** 2.122** 1.055 1.557* 1.563* 
 (0.878) (0.893) (0.962) (0.891) (0.892) 
Redistribution (lag) 4.444*** 4.753*** 4.073*** 4.246*** 4.164*** 
 (1.269) (1.282) (1.330) (1.306) (1.305) 
Trade openness  1.410** 1.407* 0.974 1.345* 1.266* 
 (0.716) (0.734) (0.897) (0.723) (0.722) 
Real GDP pc (lag) -1.607** -3.035*** -1.313 -1.541** -1.480** 
 (0.659) (0.738) (0.807) (0.670) (0.674) 
Output volatility -2.017*** -2.150*** -2.136** -1.951*** -1.926*** 
 (0.686) (0.697) (0.854) (0.703) (0.703) 
Inflation rate -0.781 -0.801 -2.772** -0.869 -0.801 
 (0.596) (0.594) (1.264) (0.624) (0.617) 
Unemployment rate -3.025*** -2.574*** -2.902*** -3.057*** -2.714*** 
 (0.693) (0.705) (0.773) (0.726) (0.754) 
Change in productivity 12.465*** 10.441*** 12.414*** 12.746*** 12.211*** 
 (3.113) (3.166) (3.787) (3.236) (3.239) 
Change in LFP 4.841** 4.587** 7.732*** 4.251* 4.084* 
 (1.938) (1.955) (2.404) (2.256) (2.253) 
Duration of episode  0.122***    
  (0.024)    
REER   -0.008   
   (0.009)   
Change in agricultural employment    -4.952  
    (3.525)  
Change in industry employment     15.048* 
     (8.499) 
Observations 980 980 831 942 942 
Pseudo-R2 0.145 0.165 0.139 0.143 0.144 
Note: All models are estimated by logit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The constant term is not reported for 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. LFP and REER denote, 
respectively, labor force participation and real effective exchange rate. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
 
                                                 
17  The real effective exchange rate has a bearing on growth and the distribution of income by effecting the relative 
price of tradables and non-tradables. To the extent that productivity is higher in sectors producing tradables, a high real 
effective exchange rate discourages a shift in resources towards higher-productivity activities, which is growth-enhancing, 
but it leads to income gains for workers in the non-tradable sector, the overall effect on the income distribution depending 






4.2. Robustness to different estimators 
  
To test for the robustness of the results of the logit regressions, we re-estimated the baseline model 
by OLS and a rare events logit (or relogit) estimator. In a logistic regression, the Maximum Likelihood 
estimates are consistent but only asymptotically unbiased. The basic problem is having a number of units 
(inclusive growth episodes) in a panel that has no events. This means that the country-specific indicators 
corresponding to the all-zero countries perfectly predict the zeroes in the outcome variable (Gates, 2001; 
King, 2001). This is a well-known phenomenon in the statistical literature (for an overview see Gao and 
Shen, 2007). The simplest way of dealing with this problem is decreasing the rareness of the event of 
interest:18 by lowering the threshold of what constitutes the event of interest or expanding the data 
selection period, for example, there is less need to correct for rareness. Alternatively, the King and 
Zeng’s (2001) bias correction method, the relogit estimator, can be used.19  
 
The relogit estimator for dichotomous dependent variables provides a lower mean square error in the 
presence of rare events and can be defined as follows: 
 
itProb(IG 1| ) ( ' )it itZ Z     it itProb(IG 1 | , X ) ( ' ' )it i it itS S X    η γ ,  (5) 
with i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T, where      ' ' X '
1 1
1 1it i it itZ Se e    
   
  η γ
, , ,   are the vectors of 
the parameters to be estimated, and )(  is the logistic function.  
 
The parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood, and the variance of the estimated 
coefficients can be expressed as     1'ˆ  VZZVar , where V is a diagonal matrix, with diagonal entries equal 
to      1 . In the case of rare events,    will be generally small. However, as pointed out by 
King and Zeng (1999a, 1999b, 2001), the estimates of    and      1  among observations that 
                                                 
18  For this reason, we also include in the baseline regressions (and robustness that follow) episodes of inclusive 
growth of one year in duration to minimize this rare-events potential problem. 




include rare events (in our case, for which IG = 1) will be typically larger than those among observations 
that do not include rare events (i.e., for which IG = 0). Consequently, their contribution to the variance 
will be smaller, rendering additional ‘rare’ events more informative than additional ‘frequent’ events. 
Therefore, we follow King and Zeng (1999a, 1999b) and correct for the small sample and rare events 
biases and estimate a relogit model where the sampling design is random or conditional on Zit.20 
 
The regression results are reported in Table 2. While the parameter estimates obtained by OLS are 
similar to the baseline ones estimated by logit, lagged growth becomes statistically significant in the 
relogit regression, whereas the education/skills and social protection channels lose significance.  
 
Table 2: Determinants of inclusive growth: Bivariate specification, alternative estimators  
Variables Models estimated by: 
 Logit (baseline) OLS RELOGIT 
    
Real GDP pc growth (lag) 1.865 0.379 4.009* 
 (2.805) (0.535) (2.417) 
Human capital 1.789** 0.359** -0.272 
 (0.878) (0.171) (0.202) 
Redistribution (lag) 4.444*** 0.906*** 0.265 
 (1.269) (0.262) (0.358) 
Trade openness  1.410** 0.293** 0.386** 
 (0.716) (0.145) (0.183) 
Real GDP pc (lag) -1.607** -0.326** 0.014 
 (0.659) (0.131) (0.032) 
Output volatility -2.017*** -0.390*** -0.979* 
 (0.686) (0.133) (0.517) 
Inflation rate -0.781 -0.066 -0.545 
 (0.596) (0.074) (0.436) 
Unemployment rate -3.025*** -0.503*** -2.973*** 
 (0.693) (0.122) (0.777) 
Change in productivity 12.465*** 2.024*** 10.632*** 
 (3.113) (0.550) (2.548) 
Change in LFP 4.841** 0.840** 3.069* 
 (1.938) (0.377) (1.824) 
    
Observations 980 990 990 
R2  0.178  
Pseudo R2 0.145   
Note: The baseline model is estimated by logit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The constant term is omitted for 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. LFP denotes labor force 
participation. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
4.3. Alternative dependent variables 
 
                                                 




The analysis has so far used income distribution data available from SWIID to define the 
chronology of inclusive growth episodes. To test for the robustness of the empirical findings, we re-
estimated the baseline equation using different sources of income distribution data. The regression 
results, reported in Table 3, show that human capital accumulation, changes in multifactor productivity 
and the unemployment rate are robust across specifications. Moreover, the estimated coefficients are 
greater in magnitude for the chronology of inclusive growth episodes based on net income (after taxes 
and transfers) than on gross income (before taxes and transfers). 
 
Table 3: Determinants of inclusive growth: Bivariate specification, alternative income 
distribution measures  
Variables Models based on income distribution data available from: 
 SWIID (Gross, baseline) WB Texas UN WIDER SWIID (Net) 
      
Real GDP pc growth (lag) 1.554 -2.305 5.714 0.499 1.911 
 (2.797) (2.762) (3.976) (2.906) (2.802) 
Human capital 1.801** 1.575* 2.862* 1.506 1.193 
 (0.866) (0.899) (1.512) (0.981) (0.841) 
Trade openness  1.129 1.567** 0.082 1.453* -0.282 
 (0.705) (0.708) (1.006) (0.786) (0.698) 
Real GDP pc (lag) -1.558** 0.892 -1.374 -0.416 0.344 
 (0.656) (0.749) (1.048) (0.720) (0.645) 
Output volatility -2.000*** -0.514 -1.586 -0.163 -2.030*** 
 (0.684) (0.620) (1.037) (0.804) (0.686) 
Inflation rate -0.695 -1.049** 0.597 -1.166 -0.463 
 (0.575) (0.529) (0.771) (0.779) (0.487) 
Unemployment rate -3.105*** -4.251*** -2.128** -2.181*** -3.074*** 
 (0.693) (0.677) (0.919) (0.695) (0.685) 
Change in productivity 11.836*** 12.637*** 18.807*** 12.503*** 13.823*** 
 (3.093) (2.904) (4.813) (3.427) (3.146) 
Change in LFP 4.739** 0.481 3.166 1.658 4.243** 
 (1.923) (1.808) (3.636) (2.072) (1.942) 
      
Observations 980 982 563 835 977 
Pseudo-R2 0.135 0.170 0.121 0.117 0.131 
Note: All models are estimated by logit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The constant term is omitted for 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. LFP denotes labor force 
participation. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
4.4. Evidence from multinomial probits   
 
To shed further light on the empirical links between growth and income distribution, we re-
estimated the baseline regressions by multinomial probit using the multivariate definition of inclusive 
growth and the corresponding chronology of episodes. The results, reported in Table 4, suggest that the 
growth channel is stronger than in the bivariate case, with lagged growth in real GDP per capita attracting 




and real GDP per capita, remain as in the baseline specification. Also, as in the case of the regressions 
estimated by logit, the parameter estimates are higher in magnitude for the chronology of inclusive 
growth episodes based on net income (after taxes and transfers) than on gross income (before taxes and 
transfers). 
 
Table 4: Determinants of inclusive growth: Multinomial specification, alternative income 
distribution measures 
Specification Models based on income distribution data available from: 
 SWIID (Gross, baseline) WB Texas UN_WIDER SWIID (Net) 
      
Real GDP pc growth (lag) 3.631* -3.122 3.370 0.765 1.901 
 (2.068) (2.251) (2.788) (2.145) (2.050) 
Human capital -0.234 -0.412** -0.267 -0.092 0.169 
 (0.173) (0.197) (0.239) (0.193) (0.172) 
Trade openness  0.333** 0.377** 0.255 0.198 0.297** 
 (0.141) (0.188) (0.228) (0.188) (0.141) 
Real GDP pc (lag) 0.012 -0.018 0.059 -0.030 -0.014 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.040) (0.031) (0.029) 
Output volatility -0.840* -0.594 -1.379** -0.632 -1.236*** 
 (0.449) (0.469) (0.631) (0.496) (0.445) 
Inflation rate -0.536 -0.495 0.310 -1.396** -0.432 
 (0.381) (0.333) (0.418) (0.573) (0.359) 
Unemployment rate -2.480*** -3.364*** -1.926*** -1.964*** -2.189*** 
 (0.497) (0.576) (0.613) (0.554) (0.494) 
Change in productivity 9.256*** 7.929*** 11.534*** 9.789*** 9.605*** 
 (2.150) (2.289) (3.064) (2.420) (2.159) 
Change in LFP 2.716* -0.245 -2.789 0.766 2.200 
 (1.457) (1.441) (2.658) (1.542) (1.426) 
      
Observations 990 813 572 848 990 
Note: Estimation by multinomial probit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The constant term is omitted for 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. LFP denotes labor force 
participation. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
 
 
4.5. Using different sets of controls 
 
We augmented our baseline regression (using as before the SWIID measure of gross Gini as the 
dependent variable) with additional regressors, including public expenditure, infrastructure 
development, political and institutional factors, and indicators of financial development and financial 
crises. The estimation results are presented in three tables where only the coefficients of interest (for the 
variables introduced one at a time) are reported. The set of structural determinants is omitted for reasons 
of parsimony.21  
                                                 
21  Full tables are available upon request. In general, the regressors remain signed as in the baseline specification and 





Starting with public expenditure in Table 5, we confirm the importance of human capital as a driver 
of growth inclusiveness. Social protection also comes out with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient in the logit regression. Equally important is investment in transport and ICT. Indeed, when 
turning to infrastructure, the regression results show that the longer a country’s road network the more 
inclusive growth will tend to be. Sanitation facilities and water supply, proxying for better health 
conditions, are also important, at least as far as the logit regressions are concerned. Moreover, the number 
of landlines and mobile phone lines confirm the importance of ICT as a determinant of inclusive growth 
episodes. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of inclusive growth: The role of public expenditure and infrastructure 
investment  
 
Public Expenditure Infrastructure Investment 
Variables Logit Multinomial 
Probit 
Variables Logit Multinomial 
Probit 
Change in agriculture expenditure per 
capita 
0.137 0.042 Paved road per capita 0.028 0.001 
 (0.255) (0.204)  (0.025) (0.002) 
Change in education expenditure per 
capita 
1.663*** -0.865** Total number of Km of road 0.042** -0.000 
 (0.652) (0.347)  (0.017) (0.001) 
Change in health expenditure per capita -0.289 -0.178 Total number of Km of paved road 0.007** -0.051** 
 (0.244) (0.139)  (0.003) (0.022) 
Change in defense expenditure per capita 0.536 0.213 Hospital beds per 1000cap -0.005 0.000 
 (0.577) (0.295)  (0.052) (0.007) 
Change in communication expenditure 
per capita 
0.337* 0.178* Sanitation facility per capita 0.106*** -0.000 
 (0.197) (0.106)  (0.034) (0.000) 
Change in transportation expenditure per 
capita 
0.150 0.049 Rural water source per capita 0.120*** -0.012 
 (0.238) (0.133)  (0.026) (0.012) 
Change in social protection expenditure 
per capita 
0.469* -0.103 Electric production (kwk) 0.069 -2.269 
 (0.284) (0.118)  (0.067) (1.946) 
Change in mining expenditure per capita 0.008 0.019 Mobile and landline subscription per 
capita 
0.728** 0.072 
 (0.170) (0.092)  (0.356) (0.159) 
Note: The variables of interest are introduced one at a time in the baseline model. The remaining variables are omitted for 
economy of space. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
 
As far as the political and institutional factors ae concerned (Table 6), the regression results show 
that administrative continuity, at least as far as gauged by the number of years a government stays in 
office, does not seem to affect the probability of occurrence of an inclusive growth episode in a 




regime (at least as far as the logit regressions are concerned), does seem to matter. Also, having a healthy 
legislative environment characterized by electoral activity, as well as an electoral system based on 
proportional representation, positively affects the likelihood of an inclusive growth episode. It is equally 
important that some degree of decentralization is in place to better reflect local demands and needs, at 
least as far as the multinomial probit regressions are concerned. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of inclusive growth: The role of political and institutional factors  
 
Variables Logit  Multinomial 
Probit 
Years in office -0.005 -0.013 
 (0.026) (0.016) 
Legislative election 0.475** 0.269** 
 (0.204) (0.110) 
Proportional representation 2.981*** -0.104 
 (1.009) (0.156) 
Margin of majority -1.636** -1.228*** 
 (0.794) (0.435) 
Polity2  0.079 0.056*** 
 (0.051) (0.022) 
Durability of political regime 0.050** -0.004** 
 (0.021) (0.002) 
Constraints on the executive -0.006 -0.014 
 (0.031) (0.021) 
Polity Fragmentation (decentralization) 0.951 -0.597** 
 (5.953) (0.298) 
Checks and balances 0.073 0.080* 
 (0.067) (0.043) 
   
Note: The variables of interest are introduced one at a time in the baseline model. The remaining variables are omitted for 
economy of space. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
 In Table 7, we turn to financial development and the occurrence of financial crises. The 
regression results are mixed, and most conventional proxies of financial development fail to attract 
statistically significant coefficients, with the exception of those related to the depth of mutual funds and 
reliance on remittances (in the logistic regression). As regards financial crises, systemic banking crises 
appear to have a more damaging effect on growth inclusiveness than non-systemic ones (in the logistic 
regression). Moreover, as expected, currency and financial crises seem to be particular detrimental to 






Table 7: Logit and Multinomial Probit of Inclusive Growth: the role of financial development 
and financial crises 
 
Financial Development Financial Crises 
Variables Logit Multinomial 
Probit 
Variables Logit Multinomial 
Probit 
Mutual funds 0.018* 0.000 Systemic financial crises -0.356* -0.358 
 (0.011) (0.002)  (0.215) (0.258) 
Bank Credit -0.001 -0.002 Non-systemic financial crises -0.018 -0.240 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.173) (0.206) 
Central bank assets -0.004 -0.001 Banking crises -0.287 -0.582 
 (0.019) (0.009)  (0.316) (0.417) 
Financial Deposits 0.008 0.000 Currency crises -0.812* -1.036* 
 (0.007) (0.002)  (0.422) (0.567) 
Private credit  0.003 -0.002 Domestic debt crises 0.125 0.245 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.282) (0.330) 
Stock market capitalization 0.005 -0.001 External debt crises -0.115 -0.015 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.208) (0.234) 
Bank deposits  0.008 -0.000 Total financial crises -0.532** -0.801** 
 (0.007) (0.002)  (0.255) (0.336) 
Remittances  0.122* 0.028    
 (0.074) (0.025)    
Note: The variables of interest are introduced one at a time in the baseline model. The remaining variables are omitted for 
economy of space. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
4.6. Analysis of sub-samples 
 
 We carried out an additional robustness check by splitting our sample along income and 
geographical lines and re-estimating the regressions by logit and multinomial probit. The results, 
reported in Table 8, show that the positive effects of human capital accumulation and trade openness are 
stronger in developing countries. On the other hand, the negative effect of output volatility on the 
probability of occurrence of an inclusive growth episode is stronger in the sub-sample of developed 
countries. Moreover, there are a few notable regional variations in the drivers of inclusive growth, with 
redistribution through the tax-benefit system, human capital accumulation and increases in labor force 






Table 8: Determinants of inclusive growth: Split-sample analysis 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimator Logit Multinomial 
Probit 
Logit Multinomial Probit Logit Multinomial Probit Logit Multinomial Probit 
Sample Developed countries Developing countries Asia Latin America 
         
Real GDP pc growth (lag) 5.812 7.755* 1.588 2.734 -0.840 -1.644 2.372 3.332 
 (6.015) (4.362) (3.331) (2.440) (6.231) (4.208) (5.005) (3.593) 
Human capital -0.209 -0.487* 5.929*** 0.252 -1.005 -0.129 7.760*** 0.856 
 (1.204) (0.285) (1.638) (0.283) (4.460) (0.443) (2.555) (0.624) 
Redistribution (lag) 4.721*** 0.520 7.343*** -0.329 1.533 -1.151 25.662*** 8.005** 
 (1.551) (0.480) (2.492) (0.866) (3.144) (1.549) (7.131) (3.382) 
Trade openness  -0.619 0.154 1.741* 0.685*** 2.285 0.446** 2.732 0.541 
 (1.227) (0.192) (1.011) (0.259) (1.550) (0.224) (2.427) (0.696) 
Real GDP pc (lag) -0.243 0.005 -2.682** 0.004 -1.627 0.048 -2.658 -0.030 
 (0.906) (0.054) (1.122) (0.037) (2.096) (0.058) (1.758) (0.057) 
Output volatility -4.391*** -3.004*** -0.552 -0.308 -2.141 -1.143 -0.238 -0.210 
 (1.307) (0.993) (0.843) (0.526) (1.346) (0.991) (1.345) (0.755) 
Inflation rate -2.785 1.543 -0.278 -0.484 -12.719 0.279 -0.354 -0.747 
 (4.466) (2.752) (0.569) (0.406) (8.335) (3.990) (0.711) (0.513) 
Unemployment rate -3.413*** -2.853*** -3.110*** -2.266*** -3.299 -3.898** -3.159*** -2.089*** 
 (1.292) (1.023) (0.872) (0.594) (2.324) (1.887) (1.199) (0.771) 
Change in productivity 16.025** 17.205*** 10.706*** 7.866*** 13.492 10.538** 15.065** 9.836** 
 (7.444) (4.996) (3.527) (2.462) (8.309) (5.061) (6.177) (4.348) 
Change in LFP 6.709 4.614 5.657*** 2.721* 2.115 3.445 7.273*** 3.836** 
 (6.332) (4.966) (2.089) (1.517) (11.224) (7.998) (2.759) (1.949) 
         
Observations 547 547 433 443 181 181 210 210 
Pseudo-R2 0.125  0.213  0.174  0.260  
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. LFP denotes labor force participation. 




Inclusive growth episodes, at least as defined as growth in real GDP per capita that is not 
accompanied by a simultaneous deterioration in the distribution of income, are the outcome of a variety 
of socio-economic, policy and institutional factors. Overall, human capital accumulation, the 
redistributive potential of tax-benefit systems, increases in multifactor productivity and labor force 
participation, as well as trade openness and a range of institutional characteristics, including political 
system durability and electoral regimes, are powerful determinants of the probability of occurrence of 
an inclusive growth episode. As expected, economic volatility, inflation and joblessness are detrimental 
to growth inclusiveness. This cross-country evidence is fairly robust to the use of different estimators 
(including logit and multinomial probit), chronologies of inclusive growth episodes, data sources and 
sets of regressors.  
 
From the point of view of policy design, the empirical findings are in line with mainstream 
thinking. They underscore the importance of redistribution through tax-benefit systems, human capital 




this area is the identification of those “win-win” or  “super pro-poor” policy packages that would enhance 
growth together with distributive gains and also provide a better understanding of corrective measures 
when equity-efficiency trade-offs are identified. 
 
By taking political and institutional characteristics into account, the analysis reported in this 
paper provides interesting insights for reform. While continuity is important, essentially because many 
pro-growth and distribution-friendly policies take time to bear fruit, it is not the durability of 
governments, but of political regimes, that seems to matter. Likewise, electoral systems also seem to 
affect the likelihood of growth inclusiveness, possibly in relation to the size of government, which tends 
to be larger under proportional representation than majority systems, therefore allowing for higher 
redistributive social spending. Although these linkages need to be tested further, the work pioneered by 
Persson et al. (2007), indeed shows that proportional representation induces a more fragmented party 
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Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Change in Gini SWIID gross 1,678 0.000964 0.034068 -0.19322 0.22744 
Change in Gini World Bank 2,462 0.001345 0.041319 -0.74314 0.48023 
Change in Gini Texas 1,125 0.005853 0.064182 -0.29741 0.277079 
Change in Gini WIDER 1,384 0.001693 0.07487 -0.59782 0.438551 
Change in Gini SWIID net 1,678 0.001769 0.027532 -0.1558 0.318969 
Real GDP pc 5,280 10.58597 2.26132 5.535042 17.16027 
Human capital 3,755 2.307359 0.591303 1.086181 3.618748 
Redistribution  1,744 0.194321 0.203614 -0.21004 0.922655 
Trade openness 4,334 0.790019 0.471394 0.003088 4.380917 
Output volatility 4,508 0.313911 0.344533 0.002258 5.3846 
Inflation rate 4,729 0.143202 0.366994 -1.29936 5.056657 
Unemployment rate 2,170 8.846725 5.966464 0.154022 59.5 
Productivity 4,248 22.6475 1.602984 18.82337 25.57951 







Table A1. Sensitivity to Inclusive Growth Episodes Strictly Longer than one year 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real GDP pc growth (lag) 4.471 -0.808 5.981 2.410 2.173 
 (5.965) (6.152) (6.765) (6.192) (6.215) 
Human capital 1.882* 2.333** 1.258 1.707 1.734 
 (1.047) (1.075) (1.110) (1.064) (1.065) 
Redistribution (lag) 5.093*** 5.456*** 4.632*** 4.794*** 4.703*** 
 (1.475) (1.490) (1.547) (1.521) (1.517) 
Trade openness  0.813 0.831 -0.078 0.860 0.821 
 (0.891) (0.910) (1.155) (0.896) (0.896) 
Real GDP pc (lag) -1.251 -2.838*** -0.791 -1.294 -1.270 
 (0.808) (0.904) (1.023) (0.821) (0.829) 
Output volatility -2.961*** -3.526*** -2.658** -2.680*** -2.606*** 
 (0.959) (0.989) (1.154) (0.980) (0.979) 
Inflation rate -3.423* -2.958 -6.106** -3.100 -3.052 
 (2.027) (2.007) (2.903) (1.987) (1.963) 
Unemployment rate -2.109*** -1.695** -2.279** -2.294*** -1.858** 
 (0.828) (0.843) (0.899) (0.872) (0.913) 
Change in productivity 12.682*** 9.164** 11.874** 12.976*** 12.207*** 
 (4.072) (4.106) (4.882) (4.157) (4.128) 
Change in labor force participation 3.451 3.140 6.785* 4.597 4.581 
 (2.992) (2.973) (3.895) (3.167) (3.130) 
Duration of episode  0.130***    
  (0.029)    
REER   -0.006   
   (0.011)   
Change in agricultural employment    -5.398  
    (3.884)  
Change in industry employment     18.927* 
     (10.283) 
Observations 711 711 610 685 685 
Pseudo-R2 0.136 0.159 0.126 0.131 0.132 
Note: All models are estimated by logit. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The constant term is not reported for 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
 
 
 
